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1 Introduction
In the past two decades there has been a signicant amount of macroeco-
nomic research studying the implications of adaptive learning in the forma-
tion of expectations. This approach replaces rational expectations with the
assumption that economic agents employ a statistical forecasting model to
form expectations and update the parameters of their forecasting model as
new information becomes available over time. One goal of this literature is
to nd the conditions under which the economy with this kind of learning
converges to a rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
The basic learning setting presumes that the agentsperceptions take
the form of a forecasting model with xed unknown parameters, estimates
of which they update over time.1 Such a setting does not explicitly allow
for parameter uncertainty or the use of averaging across multiple forecasting
models.2 In this paper, we postulate that economic agents use Bayesian
estimation and Bayesian model averaging to form their expectations about
relevant variables.
We investigate this issue both to study the robustness of some exist-
ing convergence results in the learning literature, and also to provide some
further justication for recursive updating scheme models. It is widely un-
derstood that if agents learn by updating what they believe to be a xed
parameter, in environments with feedback their beliefs are only correct as-
ymptotically. That is, as agents change the coe¢cients in their perceived
laws of motion, their actions inuence economic outcomes in ways that make
the law of motion actually generating the data change over time. After beliefs
have ultimately converged to a REE, agentsbeliefs are correctly specied,
but along the transition path to the REE the data generating process has
drifting coe¢cients. It seems natural to suppose that agents would allow the
coe¢cients of their forecasting models to drift over time. Heuristically, that
reasoning motivated the body of papers on constant gainlearning in which
agents attempt to track drifting coe¢cients and learning is perpetual.3 In
this paper, we suppose that agents subjectively entertain two possibilities
1See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the earlier literature; for recent critical overviews
see Sargent (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2009).
2A few papers have incorporated model averaging in a macroeconomic learning setting.
For examples, see Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2008).
3See Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), Sargent and Williams (2005), and Evans,
Honkapohja, and Williams (2010), for examples.
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one that says that the data generating process is constant, and another
that says that it drifts over time. Our agents update the probabilities that
they place on these two possibilities. We study the long-run behavior of this
process of jointly updating models and probabilities over models.
More precisely, we study a setting in which the pair of models used by
agents includes a grain of truthin the sense that the functional form of
one of the models is consistent with the REE of the economy while the other
model is misspecied relative to the REE.4 In particular, as above we assume
that agents also employ a time-varying parameter (TVP) model as a second
available forecasting model. The analysis is carried out using a standard
general set-up, discussed, e.g., in chapter 2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
It is known that for this model there is convergence of usual least-squares
(LS) learning to a unique REE unless the expectations feedback is positive
and more than one-to-one.
We thus consider a set-up with Bayesian model averaging over a constant
parameter model that nests the REE and a TVP model. The parameters of
the models and the probability weight over models are updated in Bayesian
fashion as new data becomes available. Does learning converge to REE?
Convergence occurs for a range of structural parameters in which the
inuence of expectations on the current outcome is not too strong and
positive.
The set of structural parameters for which convergence occurs is smaller
than the less than the one-to-one feedback that is crucial for LS learning
without model averaging.
A striking result is that there can be convergence to the (non-REE)
TVP forecasting model even though the prior puts an atom on the
RE forecasting model. The happens when the expectations feedback
parameter is positive and su¢ciently strong but less than one-to-one.
Learning via Bayesian model averaging usually leads to model selection.
The proportion of cases of no selection in the long run is small.
One version of our general setup applies to the Muth market (or cob-
web) model in which expectations feedback is negative. For the Muth model,
4We note that there is also a game-theory literature on convergence of Bayesian learning
and the issue of the grain of truth, see Young (2004) for an overview. Here we have a
set-up in which the prior of agents includes a grain of truth on the REE.
3
learning by Bayesian model averaging converges to the REE. Our setup also
covers a version of the Lucas islandmodel in which the feedback of ex-
pectations on current outcomes is positive. For that setting, the strength
of the response of output to expected ination determines the convergence
outcome. If the feedback is su¢ciently strong, learning by Bayesian model
averaging may converge to a situation in which agents perpetually use the
TVP forecasting model.
2 Muth Model with Bayesian Learning
We consider the Muth market model
pt = + t 1pt + t 1 + t; (1)
where pt is the market price, Et 1pt denotes expectations of pt conditioned on
information at date t 1, zt 1 is an exogenous observable variable following
a stationary AR(1) process zt = t 1 + wt with wt iid(0 2w) and t
is an unobserved white noise shock with 2t
2. We normalize = 0.
We denote the subjective expectations Et to highlight that they are not
necessarily the rational (mathematical) expectation.
We remark that the Muth model (1) can be obtained from aggregating
rm supply curves that depend on Et 1pt and a market demand curve de-
pending on pt, with each also depending on aggregate shocks. The rm
supply curves in turn are derived from maximization of expected prots
and quadratic costs. If the demand and supply curves are, respectively,
downward- and upward-sloping, the Muth market model has the parameter
restriction 0, so that there is a negative feedback from expectations
to outcomes. More generally, as noted by Bray and Savin (1986), 1
provided the demand curve crosses the supply curve from above.
The setting (1) also arises for a version of the Lucas aggregate supply
model, in which supply depends on price surprises and aggregate demand
is given by a quantity-theory type of equation. For the Lucas-type macro
model the parameter restriction is 0 1, so that there is positive
feedback from expectations to outcomes. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for more details on the Muth and Lucas
models.
The REE for model (1) is
pt = t 1 + t, where = (1 )
1
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We begin with the case in which agents have a constant parameter forecasting
model, which they estimate using Bayesian techniques. The beliefs of the
agents are
pt = t 1 + t;
where t zt 1 and t N(0
2). The forecasting model of the agents at
the end of period t 1, also called the perceived law of motion (PLM), is
pt = bt 1zt 1 + t;
where bt 1 is the time t 1 estimate of . Note that in general we allow 2 =
2. There is a prior distribution N(b0; V0), which implies a posterior
distribution of f( yt 1), where yt = (yt; yt 1; yt 2; :::) and yt = (pt; zt), of
the form N(bt; Vt). Here the updating of parameters bt; Vt is given by
bt = bt 1 +
Vt 1zt 1
2 + Vt 1z2t 1
(pt bt 1zt 1)
Vt = Vt 1
z2t 1V
2
t 1
2 + Vt 1z2t 1
:
using the Kalman lter.
The dynamics of the system can be formulated as a stochastic recursive
algorithm (SRA) as indicated in the appendix, where it is shown that we
have the result:
Proposition 1 There is convergence to the REE with probability 1 if 1.
Moreover, we get
Vt =
2
(t+ 1)St z2t
0
with probability 1 for all 2, irrespective of whether 2 is correct or not.5
Bayesian learning was already considered in a somewhat di¤erent formula-
tion by Bray and Savin (1986), who assumed that agents have heterogeneous
expectations and there is a continuum of initial priors b0(i); i [0; 1] with the
same initial precision. Our setting could handle a nite number of classes of
agents with di¤erent priors.
5In particular, we get convergence to the REE whether or not the actual t is normal.
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3 Bayesian Learning with Subjective Model
Averaging
3.1 Priors on parameter variation
In the preceding section it was assumed that agentsbeliefs treat the parame-
ter as an unknown constant that does not vary over time. An alternative
set-up would be to allow time variation in . Papers by Bullard (1992), Mc-
Gough (2003), Sargent and Williams (2005), and Evans, Honkapohja, and
Williams (2010) look at this issue in models with learning. Cogley and Sar-
gent (2005) look at empirical time-varying parameter models without learn-
ing. In our self-referential set-up with learning, we adopt a formulation where
agents entertain multiple forecasting models and form the nal forecast as a
weighted average of the forecasts from the di¤erent models.
Although other extensions may be useful, we consider a simple example
of multiple forecasting models below. We assume that agents have a prior
that puts a weight 0 > 0 on constant over time and 1 0 > 0 on the TVP
model t = t 1+vt, where vt
iid
N(0 2v). In general,
2
v could be unknown,
but we assume that it is known. The next steps are (i) the computation of
the model-weighted forecast and (ii) the updating of the parameters in the
forecasting models and of the models weights as new information becomes
available.
We now develop these ideas in a simple setting using model (1) and the
assumption that agents employ two di¤erent forecasting models.
3.2 Model averaging
Thus there are just two forecasting models in use: a constant coe¢cient
model, and a TVP model with t = t 1 + vt, where vt
iid
N(0 2v) and
2
v > 0 is known.
6 More specically, and changing notation somewhat, the
PLMs of the agents are
pt = t(i)zt 1 + p(i)"pt; for i = 0; 1
t(i) = t 1(i) + (i)" , for i = 0; 1;
6We adopt this formulation for simplicity. Clearly a useful extension will be to have
nitely many subjective models.
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where zt is an exogenous observable. Here the rst equation is the PLM
for pt of subjective model i. Various assumptions about p(i) are possible.
They can be assumed known or unknown and equal or allowed to be di¤er-
ent for i = 0; 1. The second equation species the perceived parameter drift
in each subjective model. We will assume 0
(0) (1)
are known. A
third equation, specied below, gives the subjective probability weight for
subjective model one, with a prior placing (say) an equal weight on the two
models. The "jt, j = are i.i.d. standard normal and mutually indepen-
dent. Agents have normal priors on the 0(i) and a given prior probability
0 that model 0 is correct. We will usually take 0 = 0:5.
Expectations of agents are given by subjective model averaging, i.e.
Et 1pt = t 1(0)
^
t t 1(0) + t 1(1)^t t 1(1) zt 1;
where ^t t 1(0) and ^t t 1(1) are the means of the posterior distribution for
t(0) and t(1) and where t 1(i) is the posterior probability that model i
is correct, i.e.
t 1(i) = Pr(i p
t 1; zt 1]);
for i = 0; 1. The actual evolution of price pt is given by
pt = t 1pt + t 1 + a"at;
where the exogenous observables zt 1 are a stationary AR(1) process, i.e.,
zt = t 1 + z"zt:
For simplicity, we have set all the intercepts to be zero. Otherwise, subjective
intercepts for each model would also need to be estimated and agents would
plausibly also allow for parameter drift for intercepts. As noted above, in
the Muth market model we usually have 0, but in Lucas-typemodels
0 1.
We are especially interested in how the weight t(1) of the TVP model
evolves. Suppose that (0) = 0 and (1) > 0. Will we have t(1) 0
and ^t = (1 )
1 as t , with probability one, so that there is
convergence to REE? We suspect that this will depend on the magnitudes of
both and (1). We venture an initial guess that the most stablecases
are possibly in the range 1 0:5. The basis for this guess that in the
standard LS learning setting parameter values in the range 0:5 < a < 1 may
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yield slow convergence to REE and in the case 1 a possible problem of
overshooting can emerge when agents overparameterize the PLM under LS
learning. For = 0 the pt process is exogenous and here we certainly expect
t(1) 0 and ^t with probability one. We would therefore expect
t 0 and convergence to REE also for near 0. However, there does seem
to be the possibility with = 0 that t(1) remains near 1 for long periods
or even that t(1) 1. In what follows we examine these issues by means
of numerical simulations.
We now give the recursive updating equations for i = 0; 1. The Kalman
lter, see e.g. Hamilton (1994) p. 399 and 380, gives the updating equations
for the mean ^t+1 t(i) of the (Gaussian) posterior distribution of t+1(i) as
follows:
^
t+1 t(i) =
^
t t 1(i) +
Vt t 1(i)zt 1
2
p(i) + Vt t 1(i)z
2
t 1
(pt ^t t 1(i)zt 1)
Vt+1 t(i) = Vt t 1(i)
z2t 1Vt t 1(i)
2
2
p(i) + Vt t 1(i)z
2
t 1
+ 2 (i):
Here var(^t t 1(i) t(i)) = Vt t 1(i). We will also need the mean and variance
of the conditional distribution for t conditional on information through t,
which are given by ^t t(i) = ^t+1 t(i) and Vt t(i) = Vt+1 t(i)
2(i):
3.3 Updating formulae for model probabilities
Finally, we need the updating formula for t(i) = Pr(i pt; zt). We will make
use of Cogley and Sargent (2005), Appendix A to get the recursion. Writing
t(i) = Pr(i p
t; zt); we have
t(i) =
f(pt; zt i) 0(i)
f(pt; zt)
_ mit 0(i), where
mit = f(p
t; zt i)
= L(pt; zt 0(i); i)f ( 0(i)) 0(i):
Here f( 0(i)) denotes the prior distribution for 0(i), f(p
t; zt i) denotes the
probability density for (pt; zt) conditional on the model, L(pt; zt; 0(i) i) is
the likelihood function for model i, and 0(i) is the prior probability for
model i = 0; 1 (with 0(1) = 0 and 0(0) = 1 0(1)). Moreover, f(pt; zt)
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is the marginal distribution of the sample across models. Thus, mit is the
marginalized likelihood for model i. Since
(0)
and
(1)
are assumed known,
we have not made the dependence of the distributions on them explicit.
First note that
f( t(i) p
t; zt; i) mit = L(pt; zt p
t 1; zt 1 t(i); i) f( t(i) p
t 1; zt 1; i)
f(pt 1; zt 1 i); or
mit
mi;t 1
=
L(pt; zt p
t 1; zt 1 t(i); i) f( t(i) p
t 1; zt 1; i)
f( t(i) p
t; zt; i)
~At(i):
Here f( t(i) p
t 1; zt 1; i) denotes the normal density with mean ^t t 1(i) and
variance Vt t 1(i), i.e.
f( pt 1; zt 1; i) = (2 t t 1(i))
1=2 exp
1
2
( ^t t 1(i))
2
Vt t 1(i)
:
Similarly,
f ( pt; zt; i) = (2 t t(i))
1=2 exp
1
2
( ^t t(i))
2
Vt t(i)
;
and
L(pt; zt p
t 1; zt 1 ; i) = f(pt zt 1 ; i) f(zt zt 1);
where
f(pt zt 1 ; i) = (2
2
p(i))
1=2 exp
1
2
(pt zt 1 )
2
2
p(i)
; and
f(zt zt 1) = (2
2
z)
1=2 exp
1
2
(zt zt 1 )
2
2
z
.
It can be veried that mit=mi;t 1 does not depend on t(i) even though each
of the three terms in the expression does.7 In fact,
~At(i) = f(zt zt 1)At(i), where
7A Mathematica routine for this is available on request.
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At(i) = exp
(pt ^t t 1(i)zt 1)
2
2( 2p(i) + Vt t 1(i)z
2
t 1)
2 ( 2p(i) + Vt t 1(i)z
2
t 1)
1=2
:
Since
t(i) = Pr(i p
t; zt) =
f(pt; zt i) 0(i)
f(pt; zt)
;
the posterior odds ratio for the two models is given by
rt =
t(1)
t(0)
=
f(pt; zt i = 1) 0(1)
f(pt; zt i = 0) 0(0)
=
m1t
m0t
assuming 0(1) = 0(0) for the prior of the two models. (More generally, the
prior odds ratio would come in.). We thus have
m1;t+1
m0;t+1
=
m1;t
m0;t
At+1(1)
At+1(0)
:
We then use the fact that m1;t=m0;t = t(1)=(1 t(1)) in the last equa-
tion. Solving for t+1(1) then gives:
t+1(1) =
t(1)At+1(1)
At+1(0) t(1)At+1(0) + t(1)At+1(1)
:
This equation describes the updating of the model weights over time and
completes our specication of the formulae for the posteriors of the parame-
ters of both forecasting models and for the posterior probabilities of the two
models.
4 Simulation Results
We now present simulation results for our set-up. Key parameters are the
model parameters and and the belief parameter (1). We set (0) = 0.
Other model parameters are set at values = 0:5 z = 1 and a = 1 in the
simulations. We assume that agents set p(1) = p(0) = 1: Their priors at
t = 1 are assumed to be
V1 0(i) = 0:2 for i = 0; 1
^
1 0(i) = b+ "b V1 0(i) for i = 0; 1;
10
% model 1 % model 0 % unselect
-0.5 0 100.0 0
0.1 0 100.0 0
0.4 0.2 95.8 4.0
0.5 5.7 82.7 11.6
0.6 32.7 60.5 6.8
0.7 56.0 43.3 0.7
0.85 70.0 30.0 0
0.95 61.6 38.2 0.2
0.99 49.3 50.7 0
Table 1: The role of expectations feedback in model selection. Percentage
of 10,000 simulation runs selecting either model 1, model 2, or neither after
40,000 periods.
where "b is a standard normal random variable. In addition we set the model
priors as
0(i) = 0:5 for i = 0; 1.
Except where otherwise stated, we simulate for T = 40; 000 periods and
do N = 10; 000 simulations. In our tables we report the proportion of the
simulations in which each model is selected. To assess this we say that
model 1 is selected if T (1) > 0:99999999 and model 0 is selected if T (1) <
0:00000001. In our benchmark table the role of is studied, and the other
key parameters are set at (1) = 0:005 and = 0. The results are in Table
1:
The results in Table 1 are intriguing, and are further illustrated in Figure
1. For 0:5 learning with Bayesian model averaging converges to the
REE with high (empirical) probability. As the value of gets closer to 0:5
the probability starts to fall below one and for values near = 0:5 both
cases of selection of the TVP model and of non-selection have small positive
probabilities. As the value of is raised above 0:5 the frequency of selection
of the TVP model increases but in a non-monotonic way as 1.
11
-0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fraction of 10,000 Simulation Runs Selecting Model
a
Model 1
Model 0
No Selection
Figure 1: Proportions of selections of models 0 and 1.
It can be seen from Figure 1 that a fairly strong positive expectational
feedback creates the possibility that agents come to believe that the economy
is generated by the time-varying parameter model 1. When there is negative
expectations feedback, as in the Muth cobweb model with normal supply
and demand slopes, then agents learn asymptotically the REE. Convergence
to the REE also occurs when there is positive expectational feedback that
is not too strong, i.e. for 0:5. However for 0:5 there is a clear
possibility of convergence to a non-RE equilibrium in which agents believe
that the endogenous variable pt is generated by a time-varying model of the
form pt = btzt 1 + "pt where bt follows a random walk.
Interestingly, the dependence of the selection result on is non-monotonic.
As increases from 0:1, the proportion of simulations selecting model 1 in-
creases until around = 0:85. At that point, further increases in lead to
reductions in selection of model 1, and as gets very close to 1 the propor-
tions are nearly 50-50. Thus, su¢ciently strong expectations feedback makes
agents more likely to believe in the drifting parameter model, but with very
12
% model 1 % model 0 % unselect
0.99 60.8 39.2 0
0.90 54.5 45.4 0.1
0.75 50.5 48.8 0.6
0.25 46.7 51.0 2.3
0 46.8 50.6 2.6
-0.25 47.2 50.2 2.6
-0.75 50.3 49.2 0.5
-0.90 54.0 45.9 0.1
-0.99 60.6 39.5 0
Table 2: Robustness of results with respect to autocorrelation of observable
shocks.
strong feedback they are just as likely to believe in the constant parameter
model.
We remark that for cases in which model 1 is selected at T = 40; 000
we have found that in longer simulations of T = 100; 000 the convergence is
to T (1) = 1 up to computer accuracy. This implies that such a numerical
simulation would deliver t(1) = 1 for all t > T .
Next we consider the sensitivity of the outcomes to the parameters and
(1). We x = 0:65 and (1) = 0:005, and rst consider di¤erent values
of . The results are reported in Table 2. It can be seen that impact of
, the correlation in zt, is fairly small. Larger values of , either positive
or negative, increase the likelihood of model 1 being selected. However this
impact is not very substantial.
Finally, for = 0:65 and = 0 we consider variations in (1). The
results are shown in Table 3. As the perceived parameter variation in the
forecasting model 1 falls, the proportion of simulations converging to model 0
decreases and, apparently falls to zero for (1) su¢ciently small. However,
for small values of (1) Table 3 suggests the possibility of non-selection be-
tween the two models. To study this further we considered longer simulations
of T = 1; 000; 000 for the cases when (1) < 0:005. These results are shown
in the second section of the table. There we see that the instances of non-
selection eventually resolve, and the proportion of simulations converging to
model 1 continues to increase as the variability in the its random walk in-
novation decreases. Intuitively, for (1) small it is more di¢cult for agents
to distinguish between the two models, which is why the selection results
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(1) % model 1 % model 0 % unselect
1.0000 3.2 96.8 0
0.5000 7.0 93.0 0
0.2500 14.1 85.9 0
0.1000 21.3 78.7 0
0.0500 29.6 70.4 0
0.0100 41.4 58.5 0.1
0.0050 47.3 50.7 2.0
0.0025 42.2 30.1 27.7
0.0010 31.1 0 68.9
0.0005 22.8 0 77.2
0.0050 48.4 51.7 0
0.0025 52.8 47.2 0
0.0010 59.1 40.9 0
0.0005 62.9 36.9 0.2
Table 3: Role of standard deviation of random walk in model selection. The
rst section is T = 40; 000, while the second is for T = 1; 000; 000.
require longer samples. Nevertheless, for large enough samples, model 1 is
increasingly selected. For this case of = 0:65 there is su¢cient dependence
on expectations to make the time-varying parameter model a possible out-
come, but the likelihood of this outcome increases as the drift in coe¢cients
becomes smaller. That is, a slowly varying random walk seems to be a bet-
ter t for the actual law of motion than a model with substantial parameter
drift. 8
We normally do not see switching between t(1) near 0 and near 1 within
a simulation. There may possibly be such cases for near 0:5, since we have
observed a few cases when = 0:4 and (1) = 0:001 in which t(1) is near
1 at t = 40; 000, which might resolve to t(1) = 0 eventually.
8For = 0:4 it is also the case that for (1) su¢ciently small the possibility of
non-selection increases with relatively shorter T . But as T is increased the proportion of
non-selecting simulations falls and agents increasingly select model 0.
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5 Additional Interpretation and Analysis
The preceding results are not straightforward to interpret, because a number
of forces are at play. In this section we provide two auxiliary results that will
help in obtaining a partial interpretation of the surprising result that non-RE
forecasting model 1 has fair chance to get selected when the expectational
feedback is su¢ciently strong.
The rst result is about comparison of rational and non-rational mean
forecast errors. At any moment of time, for each model i = 0; 1 agents
have estimates ^t t 1(i) of t, which are used to form forecasts of pt. For
convenience, we use the temporary notation
b = t 1(0)^t t 1(0) + t 1(1)^t t 1(1):
Then the following result will be useful in interpreting our results.
Lemma 2 Suppose at time t agents believe in the PLM
pt = bzt 1 + "pt
with probability 1, where b = b = (1 ). (Here b is the REE coef-
cient value). Then under the resulting actual law of motion (ALM), the
forecast Et 1pt = bzt 1 has lower conditional MSE (mean square forecast er-
ror, conditional on zt 1) than the REE forecastEt 1pt = bzt 1, provided
1=2 1.
Suppose that model 0 converges to b, i.e. ^t t 1(0) b as t . We
know this is the case if only model 0 is used by agents, but it plausibly holds
more generally when both models are in play. In that case, the forecasts from
model 1 will be more accurate, in the conditional MSE sense, if and only if
0:5. On average the more accurate forecasting model will lead to an
upward revision in its probability. Thus, for 0:5 one would expect t(1)
to tend to increase over time. This suggests that one may have t(1) 1
when 0:5.9
Special case: agents set t(1) = 1 for all t. Here the small constant
gainapproximation (i.e. small (1)) is employed, making the framework
9The Lemma also holds for 1, but 1 is a maintained assumption (the standard
condition for stability under LS learning).
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similar to that used in Evans, Honkapohja, and Williams (2010). Formally,
the setting is now
pt = tzt 1 + p"pt; and
t = t 1 + "
for the PLM, where for brevity the index to model 1 has been omitted in t,
p and . The rest of the system is
pt = t 1pt + t 1 + a"at;
Et 1pt =
^
t t 1zt 1;
^
t+1 t = ^t t 1 +
Vt t 1zt 1
2
p + Vt t 1z
2
t 1
(pt ^t t 1zt 1)
Vt+1 t = Vt t 1
z2t 1V
2
t t 1
2
p + Vt t 1z
2
t 1
+ 2 :
The ALM is pt = (^t t 1 + )zt 1 + a"at. We analyze this system in the
Appendix. The analysis implies that asymptotically ^t+1 t is approximately
an AR(1) process, with mean equal to the RE value, and with (i) a variance
proportional to 2(1) and (ii) a rst-order autocorrelation parameter that
tends to 1 as 2 (1) tends to 0.
The result for the special case and the above Lemma suggest the reason for
convergence of Bayesian updating to the TVP model 1, provided 2 (1) > 0
is small enough. A sketch of the argument is as follows (we are assuming
2 (1) > 0, 2 (0) = 0). Suppose that t(1) = 1, all t, i.e. agents believe in
the TVP model 1 w.p.1 for all t. Under model 0, we expect t+1 t(0) b
as t , based on the approximation results. Under model 1 we will
have t+1 t(1) converging to a distribution centered on b, with deviations
that are strongly and positively serially correlated. Hence by the Lemma
the average forecast error under model 1 will be less than under model 0 if
0:5 1. Since actual squared errors strongly impact the evolution of
t(1) this strongly suggests that t(1) = 1 can be a stable outcome. (However
other factors inuence the t(1) updating.) This argument also suggests that
for 0 and for 0 0:5model 1 will not be a xed point asymptotically.
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6 Conclusions
It is natural to assume that in situations with imperfect knowledge economic
agents try to use multiple models and weighted averages of forecasts when
they form expectations about the future. We consider the consequences of
such practices in a simple self-referential model in which expectations a¤ect
outcomes and agents learn using appropriate Bayesian techniques. At the
outset we impose the assumption that one of the forecasting models employed
by contains a grain of truth, i.e., for particular parameter values that model
corresponds to the correct forecasting model in an REE.
The central result in our paper shows that convergence of learning with
Bayesian model averaging to an REE occurs only when the feedback of
agentsexpectations on actual outcomes is relatively weak, less than 0:5. See
Table 1 and Figure 1. This observation should be contrasted with Proposi-
tion 1, where it is showed that when agents only use the correctly specied
forecasting model Bayesian learning converges to the REE provided that
expectations feedback has coe¢cient less than 1.
More generally, it is seen from Table 1 and Figure 1 that learning by
Bayesian model averaging leads to selection of a unique forecasting model
with very high probability. However, the selection can be a misspecied
forecasting model when the expectations feedback parameter has su¢ciently
high value. We allow agents to consider a drifting coe¢cients model and
use it to form expectations. If the feedback from expectations to outcomes is
su¢ciently high, then the resulting drift in the actual data generating process
may justify selecting the drifting coe¢cients model. Thus, even though a
constant parameter model is correctly specied asymptotically, the process
of learning may make agents doubt that model.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (outline): Dene
S 1t 1 =
tVt 1
2 + Vt 1z2t 1
:
Then we have
St 1 =
1
t
( 2 + Vt 1z
2
t 1)=Vt 1, or (2)
2=Vt 1 = tSt 1 z
2
t 1 (3)
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and
Vt = Vt 1 1
z2t 1Vt 1
2 + Vt 1z2t 1
= Vt 1
2
2 + Vt 1z2t 1
= Vt 1
2=Vt 1
2=Vt 1 + z2t 1
= Vt 1
tSt 1 z
2
t 1
tSt 1
:
Using the last expression and (3), we also have
Vt =
2
(t+ 1)St z2t
=
2
tSt 1 z2t 1
tSt 1 z
2
t 1
tSt 1
and so
1
(t+ 1)St z2t
=
1
tSt 1
or
(t+ 1)St z
2
t = tSt 1,
from which we get
St =
t
t+ 1
St 1 +
1
t+ 1
z2t
= St 1 +
1
t+ 1
(z2t St 1):
Since Et 1pt = bt 1zt 1 note that pt = ( t 1 + )zt 1 + t:
Collecting the results together, the system under Bayesian learning is
bt = bt 1 + t
1S 1t 1zt 1(pt bt 1zt 1)
St = St 1 + t
1 t
t+ 1
(z2t St 1)
pt = ( t 1 + )zt 1 + t;
zt = t 1 + wt:
Since
bt = bt 1 + t
1S 1t 1zt 1(zt 1( 1)bt 1 + + t);
we can apply standard results on stochastic recursive algorithms to show
convergence. Note that the starting point is S0 = V02+V0z20
. As usual,
lim
t
(bt; St) = ((1 )
1 S):
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The actual model is pt = t 1pt+ t 1+ "at: For
this PLM the ALM is
pt = ( + )zt 1 + "at:
Thus, the forecast Et 1pt = bzt 1 has lower conditional MSE than Et 1pt =
bzt 1 when
( + ) b < ( + ) b , i.e.
( 1)(b b) < (b b) , or
1 < ;
which holds for 0:5 and fails to hold for 0 and for 0 0:5.
Q.E.D.
Analysis of the case t(1) = 1 : Letting P^t = Pt 2 , we get
^
t+1 t =
^
t t 1 +
2 P^tzt 1
1 + 2 P^tz2t 1
[(pt ^t t 1zt 1) + a"at]
P^t+1 = P^t +
2 1
2
p
z2t 1P^
2
t
1 + 2 P^tz2t 1
;
which is a constant-gain stochastic recursive algorithm (SRA) when 2 is
treated as the gain. The associated di¤erential equation is
= ^ 2z[( 1) + ] (4)
dP^
=
1
2
p
P^ 2 2z (5)
with xed point
= (1 ) 1
P =
1
z p
:
We consider the stochastic di¤erential equation approximation to the al-
gorithm. Introduce the notation
=
P^
;
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The mean dynamics ~( ) are given by (4)-(5) and we write the system in
vector form as
= h( ): (6)
We also dene
U
2
( ) = 1[
2
( ) ~( )];
where a is the initial condition for (6). As 2 0, the normalized deviation
U
2
( ) for 0 converges weakly to the solution U( ) of
dU( ) = D h(~( ))U( ) + R1=2(~( ))dW ( ) (7)
with initial condition U(0) = 0.10 Here
A = Dh( ) =
^ 2
z( 1) 0
0 2 z
p
;
where = ( P ) . Writing the SRA in vector form as
t = t 1 + ( t 1; Xt);
where Xt = (zt 1; "at) we consider (7) from the starting point , i.e.
dU( ) = D h( )U( ) + R1=2dW ( ); where R = R( ).
The elements of R are given by
Rij =
k=
cov[Hi( k); Hj( 0)]:
In particular, for
R11 =
k=
cov[H1( k); H1( 0)]
we get
H1( t) =
Pzt 1
1 + 1 + 2Pz2t 1
[(( 1) + )zt 1 + a"at]
=
azt 1
1 + 2Pz2t 1
zt 1"at:
10We use the results in Section 7.4 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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It follows that
cov[H1( k); H1( 0)] = 0 for k = 0
since {"ak} is independent of {zt} and E"ak"a0 = 0. Thus,
R11 = var(H1( t)) =
4
avar
zt 1
1 + 2Pz2t 1
:
In particular,
R11 4avar(zt) as
2 0;
where P = 1z
1
p . If a = p then R
11 3
p z.
Next, we compute
cov[U( ); U( ^)] ( ^) = exp(^ ):C;
where
C =
0
exp(vA)R exp(vA)dv:
Note also that R12 = 0 as H2( 0) does not depend on "at. It follows that
exp(vA)R exp(vA) is diagonal and
C11 = R11
0
exp( z
1
p ( 1)2)dv
= R11
p
2(1 ) z
=
4
p
2(1 )
since R11 3p z as noted above. This implies that the autocorrelation
function of U( ) is ~r(^) = exp( ^ z
p
(1 )): As + 2U
2
( ) =
2
( )
we have the approximation
2
( ) t, where = 2 t: Using the notation
^
t = ^t+1 t we have
cor(^t; ^t k) = cor[U
2
( )( 2 ); U
2
( )( 2 k)]
= ~r ( 2k) = exp[ 2
z
p
(1 )k]:
Thus, for any k > 1, cor(^t; ^t k) 1 as
2 0.
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